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Stock markets and betting markets co-exist for professional soccer clubs listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. For each firm, two pieces of information are released to the stock 
market on a weekly basis from August to June: experts’ expectations about game outcomes 
through the betting odds, and the game outcomes. Stock markets process the news about 
games results fast. By contrast, there is no evidence of abnormal returns on the trading days 
following release of betting information. Moreover, due to the absence of a market reaction 
to betting odds and the fact that these odds are very good predictors of game outcomes, 
these odds contain unpriced information and can be used to predict short-run stock returns. 
Our findings are consistent with theories of under-reaction to public information and the 
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Stock price reactions to short-lived public information: 








Stock markets and betting markets co-exist for professional soccer clubs listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. For each firm, two pieces of information are released to the stock 
market on a weekly basis from August to June: experts’ expectations about game outcomes 
through the betting odds, and the game outcomes. Stock markets process the news about 
games results fast. By contrast, there is no evidence of abnormal returns on the trading days 
following release of betting information. Moreover, due to the absence of a market reaction 
to betting odds and the fact that these odds are very good predictors of game outcomes, 
these odds contain unpriced information and can be used to predict short-run stock returns. 
Our findings are consistent with theories of under-reaction to public information and the 
impact of the level of salience of information on the speed at which financial markets 
process information. 




Particular to the UK’s corporate landscape is that betting markets and stock markets 
co-exist for a number of firms: 16 English and 3 Scottish professional soccer clubs are 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). For each club, two pieces of information are 
released on a weekly basis from August to June: the bookmakers’ beliefs about the game 
outcomes through the odds they publish1, and the game results. The betting system used is 
a fixed-odds procedure: the odds are posted several days prior to the game and are not 
altered in response to betting before the event. 
Both these types of news provide new information about the performance of the 
teams/firms: the first type in terms of experts’ expectations and the second one in terms of 
realizations. As a consequence, one would expect that investors track both types of 
information because they provide useful news about the firms’ financial performance. 
There is a clear and direct relation between the financial performance as measured by the 
stock returns, and the achievements on the field for the following reasons. First, the 
proceeds from the national TV deals are redistributed to the teams according to a 
performance-based scheme, i.e., the end of season ranking (see Falconieri et al. (2004) and 
Palomino and Sakovics (2004) for details). Second, if a team ends the season ranked 
among the first four of the top league (the Premier League in England), it has the right to 
participate to the lucrative European competition (the UEFA Champions' League) during 
the following season.2 For teams playing in the First Division (the championship below the 
Premier League), promotion to the Premier League also brings about a significant increase 
in income from television rights.3 Third, field performance has an impact of ticket sales, 
merchandising and sponsorship revenues.  
The objective of this paper is to analyse the market reactions to betting odds and to 
game results. These two types of news differ in three crucial ways. First, betting odds 
represent opinions about the probability distribution over the game outcomes. As a 
consequence, we expect the market reaction to game results to be stronger than the one 
following the release of betting odds. Second, betting odds offer short-lived information. 
                                                
1 See Pope and Peel (1990) for a theoretical model of this system, and Kuypers (2000) and Goddard and 
Asimakopoulos (2004) for empirical studies. Sauer (1998) wrote a review of the betting literature.  
2 For example, for the season 2000-2001, Manchester United receives national television revenues of Euro 
29.29 million and Champions' League participation revenue of Euro 22.2 million. Falconieri et al. (2004) 
provide more data on television revenues in European soccer. 
3 The sport leagues in Europe operate according to a system of promotion and relegation. Teams ending at the 
top of their league are promoted to the league ranked immediately above, while teams ending at the bottom 
are relegated to the league ranking immediately below. 
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After two trading days, the game outcome is known and the odds’ information value has 
evaporated. As a consequence, if betting odds do contain valuable information, markets 
must be fast in processing this information. Third, these two types of information also 
differ in their level of salience. Betting odds are publicly available but are only posted on 
bookmakers’ websites and in ‘betting shops’. In contrast, game results are virtually 
omnipresent: they are extensively discussed in all daily newspapers, on the television news, 
and in a variety of sports shows on prime time. Therefore, the incorporation of information 
into the share prices is expected to occur faster in the case of game results. 
Our findings are the following. The market processes good news about game results 
very fast. We observe a positive abnormal return over the first trading day subsequent to 
the games, but no abnormal return over the second day. Bad news is processed more slowly 
as we observe a negative abnormal return on both the first and second trading days after a 
game. In contrast, we cannot find any evidence of a market reaction following the release 
of betting odds by the bookmakers. These findings are consistent with our assumption of 
stronger and faster market reaction in the case of game results relative to betting odds. In 
addition, given that we also find that betting odds are very good predictors of the game 
outcomes and that there is no market reaction to betting odds, the odds can be used to 
predict short-run share price returns. Hence, conditional on the reaction to game outcomes, 
our results suggest that investors under-react to betting odds. As explained by Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998), there is underreaction if ‘current good news has power in 
predicting positive returns in the future’. In this respect, our findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis of conservatism (Barberis et al. (1998)) or overconfidence in private 
information (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998))4: when observing betting odds 
investors do not update their beliefs in a Bayesian way. They seem to put too much weight 
on their priors. In sum, our results suggest that stock markets process information about 
realized performances efficiently but disregard some information about future performance.  
Our findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that investors’ reaction to public 
news depends on their relative salience: the higher the level of salience, the faster the 
public information is processed by investors. Information that does not receive large media 
coverage is incorporated only gradually into the share prices (Klibanoff, Lamont and 
Wizman (1998))  
                                                
4 Another unified theory of over- and underreaction in security markets has been developed by Hong and 
Stein (1999). Underreaction is based on a gradual release of private information. 
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  Our study differs from previous analyses of the reaction to public news events 
because we consider a different type of news and a different time horizon.5 First, the news 
releases analysed in previous studies are not released with high frequency. For example, 
earnings releases occur at best on a quarterly basis, mostly even less frequently. By 
contrast, we study the reaction to news released at high frequency, i.e., on a weekly basis. 
Second, one type of news (the betting odds) in our study is short-lived. Most recent studies 
on over- or underreactions to news use time horizons of 6 months to 5 years. After two 
trading days, our betting odds do not contain further information as the game outcomes are 
known. One could argue that studying the market reaction to betting odds is somehow 
equivalent to studying the share price reaction to analyst forecasts. However, we believe 
that this is different for the following reasons. Bookmakers are not subject to the biases 
documented about analysts: systematic optimism (Easterbrook and Nutt (1999)) and 
conflict of interests for analysts working for brokerage firms (Michaely and Womack 
(1999)). Furthermore, analysts have incentives to herd (see, e.g., Trueman (1994), Welch 
(2000) and Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000), Clement and Tse (2004)). 
Our paper is also related to the studies by Renneboog and Van Brabant (2000) and 
Brown and Hartzell (2001) who study the stock price reactions to game outcomes for listed 
sport clubs. The former study investigates whether share prices of soccer clubs listed on the 
London Stock Exchange are influenced by the soccer teams’ weekly sporty performances. 
They find a positive abnormal return following wins on the first post-game day, and 
negative abnormal returns following losses and draws. The abnormal returns for promotion 
and relegation games are also significantly higher than those of the games played earlier in 
the season. Brown and Hartzell (2001) study the impact of NBA game results on equity 
prices of Boston Celtics Limited Partnership. They find that (i) the results of the Celtics' 
basketball games significantly affect partnership share returns, trading volume, and 
volatility;  (ii) investors respond asymmetrically to wins and losses, and (iii) playoff games 
have a larger impact on returns than regular-season games. 
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section I discusses the dataset and 
Section II focuses on methodology. Section III presents the results while Section IV shows 
some the tests. Finally, Section V concludes.  
 
 
                                                
5 Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) review the literature on stock market underreactions in 
appendix A of their paper. 
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I. Data description  
 
Currently, 20 UK soccer clubs are listed on the LSE: 12 clubs on the official market 
and 8 clubs on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)6. In addition, the shares of 4 clubs 
are traded on OFEX7, but we do not include these firms in our sample because trading on 
OFEX is infrequent, is not regulated and there is no guarantee of liquidity. Of the listed 
clubs, we do not include Watford and Aberdeen as their share price history is too short (due 
to the fact that their flotations only took place in the final season of our study). We also 
exclude Leicester City and West Bromwich Albion due to problems with share price data 
availability. As a result, our dataset covers 16 British soccer clubs listed on the London 
Stock Exchange. Table I lists our sample clubs, the championship to which they participate 
(English or Scottish), their league (Premier League, First or Second Division) by season, 
their rankings at the end of the season, the market on which they are listed (the official 
market or the AIM), the flotation date, and the market capitalization at the end of the 2002 
season. The most valuable clubs are Newcastle United, Chelsea Village and Manchester 
United. 
[Insert Tables I and II about here] 
 
The daily closing share prices of the soccer clubs, their dividends, trading volumes 
and accounting data as well as the daily returns of the FT All Share index and FTSE All 
Small index are collected from Thomson Financial Datastream. The turnover and operating 
performance are exhibited in Table II. Strikingly, virtually all clubs incur operating losses 
with the notable exception of Manchester United that generated total sales of GBP 146 
million with operating earnings of more than GPB 15 million.  
The results of each game played by the clubs of Table I during the 3 seasons in the 
period 1999-2002 were purchased from Mables-Tables, an internet soccer information 
provider. Our sample does not consist of all the games as those played by two non-listed 
teams are not taken into account. This is the reason why we do not have the same number 
of games won and games lost in our sample. Betting odds data are obtained from 
                                                
6 The AIM is part of the LSE and designed for small and growing companies. The listing requirements of the 
AIM are less strict than those of the official market. Over the previous years, 3 clubs were delisted from the 
AIM: Liverpool at the end of 1995, and Loftus Road (QPR) and Nottingham Forrest, both in December 2001. 
Therefore, we do not include these clubs into our sample.  
7 OFEX is an unregulated trading facility in which JP Jenkins Ltd. is the main market maker. The following 
clubs are traded on OFEX : Arsenal, Bradford City, Manchester City and Gillingham. 
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Ladbrokes, the betting and gaming division of the Hilton Group.8 The dataset contains 
betting odds for weekend games (played on Saturday or Sunday, or occasionally on Friday 
night). These betting data are posted on Ladbrokes' website and betting offices throughout 
the UK on Wednesday night. In order to avoid contamination of event windows, we 
exclude those weekend games which are preceded by a Wednesday game.  
Those national and international games for which no betting odds are reported (which 
is exceptional) in the Ladbrokes database are also excluded. Furthermore, in case two listed 
clubs play against each other, we randomly drop one of the two observations from our 
sample. The reason is that both the odds and the game results of one team have a mirror 
image in those of the other team.9 After matching the stock returns data with the game 
results and data on betting odds, and after randomly excluding a team in games where both 
clubs are listed firms, we obtain a final sample of 916 observations. 
        
II. Methodology 
 
A. From betting odds to expectations about game outcomes. 
To derive a measure of the predictive power of the betting odds, we proceed as 
follows. Let w, d and l denote a win, draw and loss, respectively; and let xij (j=w, d, l) 
denote the betting odds for a bet on game outcome j for team i. That is, for one unit of 
money bet, xij units of money are awarded to the bettor if outcome j is realized for team i. 
Hence, xij-1 represents a measure of the bookmaker's belief about the probability of 
outcome j for team i. The normalized probabilities to win and to lose (ProbWin and 
ProbLoss) reflect bookmaker's beliefs. These measures are equivalent to the risk-neutral 
probabilities in the asset pricing literature.  
 
 
                                (1)                            
                                                  (2) 
                                    
 
                                                
8 As the largest and dominant betting bookmaker in the UK, Ladbrokes had turnover of GBP 3.81 billion in 
2002. 
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The denominator in (1) and (2) is known as the over-roundness and determines the 
gross margin of the bookmakers. It is always higher than 1 such that the bookmakers are 
expected to realize a profit while incurring minimal risk. Thus, the gamblers have a 
negative expected return. In our sample, over-roundness has a mean of 1.122 and a 
standard deviation of 0.005, which signifies that bookmakers will realise a return of 12.2% 
of the invested (betted) amounts.  
 
We also use a second measure to capture the experts’ expectations of the game 
outcome and their impact on stock returns: the probability difference (ProbDiff) of winning 
and losing games. Thus, game uncertainty is reflected by:  
     
    ProbDiffi = ProbWini – ProbLossi                                     (3) 
 
Note that we indirectly include in probability of a draw (which is captured by both 
ProbWini and ProbLossi). As will be shown later, stock prices react strongly to wins and 
losses but do not react significantly to draws. The larger ProbDiff, the more a win is 
expected relative to a loss. As ProbDiff decreases and approaches 0, the outcome becomes 
more uncertain. When ProbDiff is negative, a loss is more likely to occur a win.  
In order to group the games by type of expectations, four dummy variables are 
constructed by utilizing the above two measures of bookmaker’s expectations: ProbWin 
and ProbDiff. Each dummy variable is constructed in two ways: specification [a] is based 
on ProbWin and specification [b] is based on ProbDiff:    
• SEW (strongly expected to win): SEW[a] is equal to one if ProbWin > 0.45, and 
zero otherwise. For all these games, we also have ProbLoss < 0.28. SEW[b] is equal to one 
if ProbDiff > 0.3, and zero otherwise. 
• WEW (weakly expected to win): WEW[a] is equal to one if ProbWin ∈ [0.35,0.45], 
and zero otherwise. For all these games, we also have ProbWin > ProbLoss. Hence, a win 
is more likely than a loss. WEW[b] is equal to one if ProbDiff ∈ [0,0.3], and zero 
otherwise. 
• WEL (weakly expected to lose):  WEL[a] is equal to one if ProbWin ∈ [0.25,0.35],  
and zero otherwise. For all these games, we have ProbLoss > ProbWin. Hence, a loss is 
more likely than a win. WEL[b] is equal to one if ProbDiff  ∈ [-0.3,0], and zero otherwise. 
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• SEL (strongly expected to lose): SEL[a] is equal to one if ProbWin < 0.25, and zero 
otherwise. For all these games, we also have ProbLoss > 0.48. SEL[b] is equal to one if 
ProbDiff < –0.3, and zero otherwise. 
 
These cut-offs are arbitrary and have been chosen so as to have a sufficient number of 
observations in each sub-sample. Our results remain qualitatively similar when varying the 
cut-offs points.  
 
B. Abnormal return computation 
Denoting Pi,t the closing price of stock i on day t, and Divi,(t-1,t) the dividends paid on 
stock i over the period (t-1,t), the return of this stock on day t is defined as 
 
            
      (4)            
    
           
The alternative way of calculating raw returns, ri,t  = ln (Pi,+ Divi,(t-1,t) / Pi,t-1), does not 
influence the results of this paper. To compute the stocks’ abnormal returns, we regress 
daily returns of each soccer club on the FTSE All Small index, over the full sample period 
(i.e., Jan. 1, 1999 to Dec. 31, 2002)10. We opt for this index to control for the size effect on 
stock returns.11  
As some soccer clubs may suffer from non-synchronous trading, we add three leads 
and three lags of market returns into the market model (See Dimson (1979)). Thus, the 




εβα ττ τ ++= +
+
−=       i = 1, …, 16                                                   (5)   
where rmτ is the return of FTSE All Small index on day τ. Denoting OLS estimates of 
αi  and βiτ as ai and biτ, respectively, we construct the abnormal return of club i on day t 
(ARit) as follows12: 
                                                
10 Since the events of soccer games take place every week in a season, we cannot use pre-event data as 
estimation window. Using the full sample period as estimation window, our approach is similar to Brown and 
Hartzell (2000). Here, abnormal returns are the part of returns that cannot be explained by the covariance 
between stock returns and market returns. 
11 The results in this paper do no depend upon the choice of the market index. Using the FT All Share index 
yields similar results.  
12 We also corrected the systematic risk for regression to the mean, but this does not influence the results. 
Pi,t – Pi,t-1 + Divi,(t-1,t) 
ri,t  =  
Pi,t-1 







brarAR            i = 1, …, 16                                  (6)  
 
Given that there are some periods during the year without weekend games (summer and 
winter stops), we use two ways to account for event clustering. First, we test the AR 
significance by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which is distribution-free and robust to 
event clustering. Second, when conducting t-tests, we also control for event clustering by 
using the standard errors of average abnormal returns for each calendar day (see, e.g. 
Brown and Warner (1980: 233)). 
Given that games are played during the weekend and betting odds are posted on 
Wednesday evening after the market closes or on Thursday morning, our event window 
spans a period from Thursday (prior to the game) to Tuesday (subsequent to the game). We 
take the weekend as the event date and refer to Thursday, Friday, Monday and Tuesday as 
day -2, -1, 1, and 2, respectively. Therefore, the abnormal return on day -2 (AR(-2)) is the 
abnormal return between Wednesday’s closing time and Thursday’s closing time as 
expressed by Equation (6). Similarly, we computed the abnormal returns AR(z) with z = -1, 
1, 2. The cumulative abnormal return between days z and z', (z, z' ∈ {-2, …, 2}, z' > z) is 




Our approach to studying the information content of betting odds is structured as 
follows. First, we examine the price reaction to game outcomes. Second, we investigate the 
predictive power of betting odds with regard to game outcomes. Finally, we study the price 
reaction to betting odds.     
 
A. Market efficiency I: Stock price reactions to game results 
 
Panel A of Table III Panel A exhibits the abnormal returns over the two days 
following the soccer matches which are categorized by the game outcomes (wins, draws 
and losses) for the entire sample. We observe that the stock prices are sensitive to the 
information resulting from the game results. A win triggers a positive abnormal return of 
53 basis points on day 1 (statistically significant at the 1% level), whereas a loss is 
followed by a significantly negative return of 57 basis points over the two days following 
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the game. The mean abnormal return subsequent to a draw is negative but not statistically 
significant. In a three-day event window (not shown), market reactions to game results are 
even stronger. The CAR(1,3) are 88.26 basis points after a victory, and –100.81 basis 
points after a defeat, both significant at the 0.1% level. The CAR(1,3) after a draw is –
32.54 basis points but not significant. These findings confirm that a win (loss) provides 
investors with good (bad) news about future cash flows of these listed firms.  
        A related interesting finding is that the market seems to be faster at processing 
good news than bad news. Market reactions to a win are concentrated on the first post-
game trading day, while price reactions to a loss are realized in both days 1 and 2.  
[Insert Table III about here] 
 
We also show that the market reactions to a victory and a defeat are similar in 
magnitude (Panel A of Table III). Over a two-day window, the difference between 
reactions (in absolute value) to a win and a loss is insignificant (not reported in the table). 
This is different from the results obtained in Brown and Hartzell (2001) and Renneboog 
and Van Brabant (2000) who find that the market reaction to a defeat is stronger than to a 
victory.  
The end-of-season matches may be different in nature from the matches earlier in the 
season. The reason is that the financial consequences of a victory, a draw or a defeat are 
more important for teams fighting for promotion to a higher league or for the right to 
participate in the European championships, or to avoid relegation, as the end of the season 
draws near. To address this issue, we split our sample in sub-samples. We consider games 
played in March or earlier in the season, and those played in April or later. The results are 
presented in Panels B and C or Table III. We find that the results for the August-March 
sub-sample are similar to those obtained for the entire season (panel A). This implies that 
the significant market reaction to wins and to losses are not due to large abnormal returns 
triggered by games played late in the season. Panel C shows that results for the April-June 
sub-sample are not dissimilar but are somewhat less significant, which may be due to a 
smaller number of observations.   
In a further subsample analysis, we split the April-June sub-sample into four 
categories based on the teams’ end-of-season rankings. The reason is that the financial 
consequences of the final rankings may differ substantially from category to category, 
which may be reflected in the share price reactions. The four categories are labelled as 
follows: promotion, relegation, top-teams, and other post-March. Promotion games are 
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non-cup13 games played by teams belonging to the top six in English First or Second 
League. Relegation games are non-cup games played by teams ranked on the fifteenth 
position or lower in every league. Top games are non-cup games played by teams 
belonging to the top six in English Premier League or top two in Scottish Premier League 
as they compete for participation in the European championships. Finally, Other represent 
the other non-cup games which were not included in the above categories, but were also 
played in April, May or June. Panel A of Table IV shows strong statistically significant 
abnormal returns for the promotion candidates. A victory triggers an abnormal return of 
2.13% while a defeat leads to a negative price correction of nearly 2%. The outcomes of 
the games are quickly incorporated in the share prices (during day 1). The abnormal returns 
for the relegations candidates (panel B) and the top teams competing for the participation 
right to European soccer (panel C) are large but lack statistical significance (but sample 
sizes are tiny).   
[Insert Tables IV and V about here] 
 
We also test the market reaction to game results by running regression models 
including the variables Win, Loss and GoalDiff. Win (Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the 
team wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between the number of 
goals scored and those conceded in a game. Hence, it does not only indicate whether or not 
the team won, lost or obtained a draw, it also captures the magnitude of the victory or the 
defeat. We estimate the following regressions: 
                  CAR(1,2)  = α0 + α1.Win + α2.Loss + β.ControlVariables + ε           (7) 
                   CAR(1,2) = α0 + α1.GoalDiff + β.ControlVariables + ε            (8) 
 
where ControlVariables include the following dummy variables: PostMarch which 
equals one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM which 
equals one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home which equals one if 
the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup which equals one if the 
game is a national cup game and zero otherwise, two Year dummies, and fifteen Team 
dummies. The results presented in Table V confirm that there is a strong positive reaction 
to a victory. In the first and third regressions, GoalDiff is significantly positive at the 0.1% 
                                                
13 The cup competitions are different from regular league competitions: all the clubs of the Premier League 
and Division 1, 2 and 3 can participate in the cup competitions which is a play-off competition with 
immediate elimination upon defeat. 
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level, while in the second and fourth regressions, Win is significantly positive at the 1% 
level. In addition, the PostMarch dummy is not significant in all regressions, which implies 
that the significance of our results is not caused by the effect of a limited number of 
important games played late in the season. 
Taken together, Tables III, IV and V confirm that the market react fast to the positive 
news of a victory as the information is incorporated in the share prices on the first trading 
day subsequent to the game. The market reaction to a defeat needs 2 days to trickle into the 
share prices.  
 
B. Can betting odds predict game results? 
 
We also examine whether or not the public information released by specialists 
(namely, bookmakers) by means of fixed odds is valuable. In other words, we want to 
know whether betting odds on soccer games have some predictive power. Betting odds are 
translated into probabilities to win or lose as explained in section II.B. Hence, we estimate 
the following regressions with GoalDiff, Win and Loss as dependent variables for each type 
of model: 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1ProbWin + βControlVariables + ε                   (9) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1SEW[a] + α2WEL[a] + α3SEL[a] + βControlVariables + ε  (10) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1ProbDiff + βControlVariables + ε                 (11) 
Dep. Variable = α0 + α1SEW[b] + α2WEL[b] + α3SEL[b] + βControlVariables + ε  (12) 
 
The models with GoalDiff as the dependent variable are estimated using an ordered 
probit model (where the constant terms are normalized to zero). Those with Win or Loss as 
dependent variables are estimated with binary probit models.  
[Insert Table VI about here] 
 
Both panels A and B of Table VI show that there is a very strong relation between the 
game results and the betting odds. The clubs with a high (ex ante) probability to win 
(ProbWin), a high probability difference (ProbDiff) and the teams which are strong 
expected to win (SEW), do indeed win their games (models 1, 2, 4 and 5) and are able to 
avoid defeats (models 4 and 6). Likewise, the teams of which the betting odds strongly 
predict a defeat (SEL) are indeed frequently defeated (as reflected by the positively 
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coefficients in models 4 and 6) and rarely win (as indicated by the negative coefficients in 
models 1, 2, 4 and 5). It should be noted that all these results are highly statistically 
significant within the 0.1% level.  
Panel A of Table VI also shows that when the betting odds are less clearly predicting 
a defeat (or a victory) as measured by the variable WEL[a] (weakly expected to lose), there 
is no significant relation between WEL[a] and the game results (GoalDiff, Win, Loss). 
When we calculate the ‘weakly expected to lose’ variable (WEL[b]) using the somewhat 
more refined method of probability differences, we find that teams that are weakly 
expected lose, do indeed incur more defeats and realise fewer victories (Panel B). Still, the 
parameter coefficients as well as the statistical significance is lower than for the cases 
which are strongly predicting victories or defeats. Thus, a higher degree of uncertainty in 
the betting odds does indeed reflect the higher uncertainty on the field.  
      To conclude, we can state that betting odds are very good predictors of game 
outcomes. Our results are consistent with the existing literature on betting market 
efficiency (see Sauer (1998) for a review). 
 
C. Market efficiency II: Stock price reactions to the release of betting odds 
       
Given that (i) stock prices react strongly to game results and (ii) betting odds are good 
predictors of these results, one would expect that stock prices react to the announcement of 
betting odds. If markets are efficient, the above should be fulfilled according to Bayes’ 
rule. Table VII exhibits the mean (cumulative) abnormal returns on the two days prior to 
the game (Thursday and Friday). Somewhat surprisingly, we find neither an economic nor 
statistically significant price reaction to the posting of betting odds.  
We test the market reaction further by regressing CAR(-2,-1) on the predictions from 
the betting odds (SEW, WEL, SEL) and on our standard control variables, and exhibit the 
results in Table VIII. We observe that none of the estimated coefficients of these 
expectation dummies is significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with our 
earlier finding that investors do not react to betting odds to update their beliefs. Again, in 
the light of the fact that when bookmakers make strong predictions in their betting odds the 
game results are accurately forecast, it is surprising that the market seems to ignore this 
information.   
[Insert Tables VII and VIII about here] 
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There are two mutually exclusive explanations for this result. The first explanation is 
that betting odds do not contain any new information that has not been incorporated into 
prices. The second explanation is that investors underreact to information conveyed by the 
betting odds. To find out which of the two explanations prevails, we investigate whether or 
not betting odds have predictive power for future stock returns. If the odds do predict short-
run returns, it follows that the market underreacts to the information in the odds. Indeed, as 
explained by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), there is underreaction if ‘current good 
news has power in predicting positive returns in the future’. Formally, to test the predictive 
power of odds for stock returns, we compute the average AR(1), AR(2), and CAR(1,2) 
conditional on the strength of the bookmakers’ prediction as reflected in the betting odds 
(SEL, WEL, WEW, SEW). The results of Table IX show – using either specification (based 
on the probability to win and on the probability difference) – that if teams are strongly 
expected to win the abnormal returns AR(1) (and CAR(1,2)) are significantly positive. This 
implies that if the betting odds point out that some teams have a very high probability to 
win their game, the purchase of an equity stake in these listed soccer firms will lead to 
abnormal returns of almost 29 basis points.   
[Insert Tables IX and X about here] 
 
To test this relation between the prediction of the game results by the betting odds 
and the market price reaction subsequent to the game, we run the following OLS 
regressions, whereby the control variables are defined above: 
CAR(1,2)  = α0 + α1SEW[i] + α2WEL[i] + α3SEL[i] + βControlVariables + ε, i=a,b  (13) 
 
Table X confirms the results of Table IX: when a team is strongly expected to win 
(SEW[a] and SEW[b]), we find a statistically significant relation with the CAR(1,2) within 
the 5% level. Thus, strong expectations to win announce positive abnormal returns 
immediately after the game. This implies that betting odds can predict short-run returns. 
Hence, we conclude that the lack of market reaction to betting odds is driven by under-
reaction to information about future performance. 
Taken together, the results of Sections III.A and III.C show that the market reaction 
to public information strongly depends on the type of news released. There are two possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. The first explanation is overconfidence in private 
information  (see, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)). When receiving 
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public information, agents do not update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. They put too 
much weight on their priors and too less weight on the information that is just released. The 
second explanation for our results regards the differences of media coverage (salience) on 
betting odds and game results. Game results are available on a large scale: they are 
presented in all daily newspapers and in various TV programs. Conversely, betting odds are 
available only on bookmakers’ websites or offices. In this respect, our results are consistent 
with those of Klibanoff, Lamont and Wizman (1998). 
 
IV. Robustness of the findings 
  
A. Transaction costs 
          We also examine whether the difference in price reactions to betting odds and game 
outcomes is due to transaction costs. We do not believe that this is the case for the 
following reasons. First, the expected CAR(1,2) following a strong expectation to win by 
the bookmaker (under both specifications a and b), and the realized CAR(1,2) after a win 
are not statistically different. This implies that the absence of an investment decision based 
on betting odds is not due to transaction costs. Second, the results are not induced by (lack 
of) trading activity. For the stocks in our sample, trading volumes on Friday and Thursday 
are, respectively, 25% and 16% larger than on Monday. Conversely, trading volumes on 
Tuesday and Wednesday are respectively, 2% and 18% smaller than on Monday. Note that 
the differences are not statistically significant. This rejects the lack of liquidity as a possible 
explanation for the difference in market reaction to betting odds and to game results. 
 
B. Construction of the prediction variables from betting odds 
          We also investigate whether our results depend on the way we construct the 
prediction variables SEW, SEL, WEW, and WEL. We find that this is not the case. As 
already mentioned in Section II.B, our results remain qualitatively equivalent when 
choosing other thresholds for ProbWin and ProbDiff to define the dummy variables SEW, 
SEL, WEW, and WEL. For Specification a, the alternative sets of thresholds we tested, are: 
{0.2, 0.3, 0.4} and {0.3, 0.4, 0.5}. For Specification b, our alternatives ({-0.2, 0, 0.2}, {-
0.25,0,0.25} and {-0.4,0, 0.4}) also yield results similar to the ones presented above.  
 
C. Team media coverage 
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We also verify that our results are not driven by a few teams that benefit from large 
media coverage. First, we exclude Manchester United, the most famous (and valuable) 
soccer team in the UK. Our results remain unchanged. Second, in all regressions, we 
control for team-specific effects by using team dummies. Third, we divide the teams into 
two groups based on media coverage. The first group contains eight teams that are more 
intensely followed by the media: Aston Villa, Chelsea Village, Celtic, Leeds United, 
Manchester United, Newcastle United, Sunderland and Tottenham Hotspur. The second 
group comprises the other eight teams. The categorization of the teams in to the two groups 
with high versus low media coverage is performed using the Factiva database. Factiva, a 
Dow Jones & Reuters company, is an online information provider that provides access to 
nearly 9,000 news sources, including local, national and international newspapers, leading 
business magazines, trade publications, and newswires. To examine the media coverage of 
the listed soccer clubs, we used club names as key words and searched in news headlines in 
Factiva.com. We restrict news language to English, and exclude republishing news and 
recurring pricing and market news. We conclude that the market reaction to betting odds 
and games results are not significantly different for the two groups of soccer teams. Fourth, 
media attention may go up near the end of the season when the competition become more 
exciting. We control for this by using a PostMarch dummy in all regressions. Our results 
remain unchanged when using  post-February or post-April games as end-of-season games. 
 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
    In this paper we have studied the stock price reactions of listed soccer clubs to two 
types of public information: betting odds which incorporate information about the expected 
future performance, and game results which capture information about the realized 
performance. This study differs from previous papers on the stock price reaction to public 
news in the type of news released. First, the two types of news we consider are correlated 
in the sense that betting odds comprise a probability distribution over possible game 
outcomes. Second, these news releases occur at a relatively high frequency compared to the 
news considered in other studies. Third, betting odds are short-lived information since 
game outcomes are known shortly (two trading days) after odds are posted. 
   We have found that the markets are very fast in processing good news about game 
outcomes (victories) and somewhat slower in incorporating bad news (defeats) in the share 
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prices. The market reactions are strongly statistically significant. In contrast, we do not find 
significant abnormal returns on trading days following the release of odds by bookmakers. 
This is surprising as the betting odds are excellent predictors of the game outcomes. 
Interestingly, due to the absence of a market reaction to the disclosure of betting odds, 
these odds can be used to predict short-run market returns. This suggests that while markets 
efficiently process information about the realized performance, they underreact to 
information comprising expectations. Our findings about the underreaction to betting odds 
are consistent with conservatism of or overconfidence by investors. Upon receiving public 
information, they do not seem to update their beliefs in a Bayesian way: they put too much 
weight on their priors and too less weight on the information that is just released. Our 
results are also congruent with the salience theory relating speed of information processing 
with media coverage since information about game results is disclosed on a much larger 
scale than betting odds.  
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Soccer clubs and sporty performance 
 
    This table presents the soccer clubs in our sample and gives the positions in their affiliated leagues from 
seasons 1999-2000 to 2001-2002. LSE represents a listing on the London Stock Exchange. AIM stands for 
the Alternative Investment Market (a segment of LSE). MV is market value in June 2002, in GBP billion. EP 
(SP) stands for English (Scottish) Premier League. E1 (E2) stands for English First (Second) Division. The 
numbers next to their league are the rankings at the end of the season in 2002.  
 
 
Club List Date Exchange MV League & Position 
   
GBP 
(billion)  1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 
Aston Villa April 1997 LSE 15.2 EP 6 EP 8 EP 8 
Burnden Leasure 
(Bolton Wanderers) April 1997 AIM 5.1 E1 6 E1 3 EP 16 
Birmingham City March 1997 AIM 13.2 E1 5 E1 5 E1 5 
Chelsea Village March 1996 AIM 31.4 EP 5 EP 6 EP 6 
Celtic Sept. 1995 LSE 15.1 SP 2 SP 1 SP 1 
Charlton Athletic March 1997 AIM 7.7 E1 1 EP 9 EP 14 
Heart of Midlothian May 1997 LSE 7.9 SP 3 SP 5 SP 6 
Leeds United Aug. 1996 LSE 20 EP 3 EP 4 EP 5 
Manchester United June 1991 LSE 27 EP 1 EP 1 EP 3 
Millwall Jan. 1989 LSE 11.4 E2 5 E2 1 E1 4 
Newcastle United April 1997 LSE 31.2 EP 11 EP 11 EP 4 
Preston North End Jan. 1995 AIM 4 E2 1 E1 4 E1 8 
Southampton Jan. 1997 LSE 11.5 EP 15 EP 10 EP 11 
Sunderland Dec. 1996 LSE 18 EP 7 EP 7 EP 17 
Sheffield United Dec. 1996 LSE 2.5 E1 16 E1 10 E1 13 
Tottenham Hotspur Jan. 1983 LSE 29.5 EP 10 EP 12 EP 9 
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Table II 
Operating performance of listed soccer clubs 
 
This table presents the total sales and operating profits (in million GBP) of the listed soccer clubs. The 
percentages of total sales derived from soccer related activities are reported for 2002. Source: Datastream. 
 
Club Total Sales Operating Profit 
 2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Aston Villa 35.8 39.4 46.7 100% -5.2 -6.9 -9.9 
Burnden Leasure (Bolton Wanderers) 13.4 14.5 36.8 83% -8.6 -12.8 0.8 
Birmingham City 9.4 13.3 15.2 100% -3.9 -2.6 -6.1 
Chelsea Village 106.8 93.6 115.3 64% 2.1 -6.8 -7.7 
Celtic 38.6 42 56.9 82% -5.1 -9.4 -2 
Charlton Athletic 11.7 28.3 30.6 100% -6.7 -0.2 -12.8 
Heart of Midlothian 7.1 7.9 6.1 100% -3.3 -3.7 -3.5 
Leeds United 57.1 86.3 81.5 100% -2.9 -5.7 -28.5 
Manchester United 116 129.6 146.1 100% 15.5 19.3 15.2 
Millwall 4.8 4.8 10.6 100% -2.6 -2.6 -0.1 
Newcastle United 45.1 54.9 70.9 100% -19.3 -5.2 0 
Preston North End 5.7 7.2 9.9 100% -1.5 -0.8 0.2 
Southampton 20.8 29.1 38.5 81% -3.4 -2.3 -1.6 
Sunderland 37.3 46 43.8 100% -6.9 1.6 -7.8 
Sheffield United 5.8 6.5 10 97% -5 -3.6 -2.4 
Tottenham Hotspur 48 48.4 65 100% -4.2 -1.7 -4.8 
        
Mean 41.9 43.9 55.9 92% -4.7 -4.3 -7.4 
St. Dev 8.6 6.4 12.9 11% 0.7 3.7 3.6 
Median 28.3 34.3 41.2 100% -4.1 -3.1 -3 
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Table III 
Market reactions to game results 
 
This table presents the average (cumulative) abnormal returns ((C)ARs) in basis points subsequent to the 
soccer games. Panel B and Panel C show the (C)ARs for the sub-samples of the August-March games and the 
April-June ones, respectively. The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
are presented in the first and second rows following the ARs, respectively. 
  
  N Reaction to games 
    AR(1) AR(2) CAR(1,2) 
Panel A: All games    
Win 405 52.72 10.73 63.45 
p-value of t-test  (0.000) (0.267) (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
     
Draw 233 -8.15 -16.87 -25.01 
p-value of t-test  (0.652) (0.304) (0.367) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.337) (0.840) (0.457) 
     
Loss 278 -27.95 -29.07 -57.02 
p-value of t-test  (0.011) (0.015) (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.095) (0.008) (0.003) 
Panel B: Games in August-March   
Win 329 51.46 13.70 65.16 
p-value of t-test  (0.001) (0.193) (0.000) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
     
Draw 187 -0.64 -9.18 -9.82 
p-value of t-test  (0.974) (0.620) (0.748) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.436) (0.537) (0.497) 
     
Loss 222 -21.10 -33.12 -54.22 
p-value of t-test  (0.063) (0.023) (0.003) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.163) (0.021) (0.006) 
Panel C: Games in April-June   
Win 76 58.17 -2.15 56.02 
p-value of t-test  (0.051) (0.929) (0.186) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.222) (0.485) (0.175) 
     
Draw 46 -38.68 -48.10 -86.78 
p-value of t-test  (0.381) (0.178) (0.187) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.544) (0.397) (0.714) 
     
Loss 56 -55.10 -13.01 -68.11 
p-value of t-test  (0.081) (0.332) (0.052) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.344) (0.237) (0.154) 
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Table IV 
Market reactions to April-June games 
 
This table presents average (cumulative) abnormal returns ((C)ARs) in basis points subsequent to the soccer 
games, for the games played in April-June only. The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test are presented in the first and second row following the ARs, respectively. 
 
 
  N Reaction to games N Reaction to games 
    AR(1) AR(2) CAR(1,2)   AR(1) AR(2) CAR(1,2) 
Panel A: Promotion Panel B: Relegation 
Win 17 213.91 -58.97 154.94 3 48.97 1.8608 50.83 
p-value of t-test  (0.052) (0.440) (0.312)  (0.410) (0.891) (0.457) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.124) (0.758) (0.163)  (0.209) (0.593) (0.285) 
         
Draw 13 7.31 -209.00 -201.69 6 -213.59 25.05 -188.53 
p-value of t-test  (0.949) (0.093) (0.340)  (0.383) (0.146) (0.444) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.553) (0.007) (0.507)  (0.463) (0.116) (0.345) 
         
Loss 9 -191.93 -30.85 -222.78 7 -126.58 8.04 -118.54 
p-value of t-test  (0.010) (0.133) (0.013)  (0.253) (0.354) (0.277) 
p-value Wilcoxon   (0.021) (0.051) (0.021)   (0.735) (1.000) (0.311) 
Panel C: Top Panel D: Other PostMarch 
Win 23 12.65 4.05 16.70 33 19.41 22.77 42.18 
p-value of t-test  (0.643) (0.917) (0.744)  (0.559) (0.452) (0.393) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.976) (0.584) (0.927)  (0.131) (0.339) (0.313) 
         
Draw 6 -47.95 40.22 -7.73 21 -14.53 5.36 -9.16 
p-value of t-test  (0.109) (0.115) (0.834)  (0.548) (0.327) (0.717) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.075) (0.116) (0.917)  (0.205) (0.821) (0.498) 
         
Loss 9 -125.53 -9.96 -135.48 31 -21.21 13.46 -7.74 
p-value of t-test  (0.181) (0.865) (0.197)  (0.582) (0.445) (0.860) 
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Table V 
Market reactions to game results: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following 
soccer games. The dependent variables are CAR(1,2). Win (Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the team wins 
(loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference between the number of goals scored and those conceded 
in a game. PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is 
equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home 
game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup game and zero 





Variable : AR(1) AR(1) CAR(1,2) CAR(1,2) 
     
Constant 23.40 4.46 -7.35 -22.50 
 (0.924) (0.986) (0.983) (0.948) 
GoalDiff 18.91  26.22  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Win  58.94  83.16 
  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Loss  -19.20  -35.08 
  (0.388)  (0.254) 
PostMarch -16.28 -16.98 -29.21 -29.89 
 (0.432) (0.412) (0.309) (0.297) 
AIM -29.06 -29.03 -53.35 -60.95 
 (0.907) (0.907) (0.876) (0.859) 
Home -5.77 -4.28 0.77 0.95 
 (0.730) (0.797) (0.974) (0.967) 
Cup -18.06 -18.54 6.19 5.87 
 (0.536) (0.526) (0.878) (0.885) 
Year9900 20.18 19.02 59.03 56.63 
 (0.321) (0.350) (0.037) (0.045) 
Year0001 27.79 26.11 57.37 54.56 
 (0.174) (0.202) (0.043) (0.054) 
Team 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 0.0437 0.045 0.045 0.049 
F-Statistics 1.85 1.83 1.91 2.00 
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Table VI  
Quality of odds 
 
This table presents the estimation results of regressions testing the predictive power of betting odds. Win 
(Loss) is a dummy equal to one if the team wins (loses) and zero otherwise. GoalDiff is the difference 
between the number of goals scored and those conceded in a game. The probabilities to win and to lose (in %) 
are represented by ProbWin and ProbLoss. The probability difference of winning and losing games is 
captured by ProbDiff. We define 4 dummy variables which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to 
win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose 
(SEL). Depending on which underlying probability measure is used, we label the above variables by [a] 
(when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played 
in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero 
otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal 
to one if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise.  Ordered probit is used when the dependent 
variable is GoalDiff, and probit regressions are used with Win and Loss as dependent variables. The p-values 
of the estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 916 observations. 
 
Quality of odds [a]              Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 Ordered probit Probit Probit 
Dep. Variable: GoalDiff  Win Loss 
Panel A:       
Constant    -8.03 -6.90  8.43 6.99  
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
ProbWin 0.04   0.04   -0.04   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
SEW[a]  0.58   0.66   -0.82  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
WEL[a]  -0.13   -0.05   0.09  
  (0.226)   (0.727)   (0.507)  
SEL[a]  -0.75   -0.52   0.78  
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)  
PostMarch -0.09 -0.08  -0.08 -0.08  0.06 0.06  
 (0.303) (0.335)  (0.457) (0.488)  (0.627) (0.643)  
AIM 1.82 1.85  6.37 6.47  -7.07 -7.17  
 (0.077) (0.073)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Home -0.12 0.04  -0.11 0.04  0.14 0.02  
 (0.189) (0.669)  (0.334) (0.726)  (0.227) (0.892)  
Cup -0.15 -0.02  -0.06 0.06  0.34 0.25  
 (0.216) (0.861)  (0.728) (0.712)  (0.062) (0.146)  
Year9900 0.08 0.07  0.11 0.11  -0.16 -0.15  
 (0.368) (0.390)  (0.319) (0.333)  (0.187) (0.207)  
Year0001 0.04 0.05  0.13 0.13  -0.04 -0.04  
 (0.641) (0.593)  (0.263) (0.249)  (0.754) (0.753)  
Team Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
          
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.059  0.126 0.111  0.158 0.146  
 
 
Table VI continues on the next page.
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Table VI – Continued 
 
 
Quality of odds [b]                   Model  4 Model 5      Model 6 
 Ordered probit Probit Probit 
Dep. Variable: GoalDiff Win  Loss 
Panel B:   
Constant    -6.73 -6.82  6.83 6.92  
    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
ProbDiff 0.02   0.02   -0.02   
   (0.000)   (0.000)   
SEW[b]  0.53   0.60   -0.71  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
WEL[b]  -0.32   -0.26   0.32  
  (0.001)   (0.035)   (0.011)  
SEL[b]  -1.01   -0.90   1.17  
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
PostMarch -0.08 -0.07  -0.08 -0.06  0.05 0.03  
 (0.338) (0.447)  (0.486) (0.590)  (0.663) (0.795)  
AIM 1.81 1.92  6.36 6.53  -7.05 -7.23  
 (0.079) (0.063)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Home -0.11 0.02  -0.10 0.01  0.13 0.01  
 (0.229) (0.791)  (0.389) (0.903)  (0.270) (0.916)  
Cup -0.13 -0.03  -0.03 0.06  0.32 0.24  
 (0.300) (0.831)  (0.834) (0.728)  (0.071) (0.161)  
Year9900 0.08 0.10  0.11 0.13  -0.16 -0.19  
 (0.352) (0.261)  (0.307) (0.250)  (0.168) (0.112)  
Year0001 0.04 0.07  0.13 0.15  -0.04 -0.07  
 (0.624) (0.403)  (0.251) (0.175)  (0.722) (0.538)  
Team Dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
          









Market reactions to odds 
 
This table presents the average (cumulative) abnormal returns ((C)ARs) in basis points after the betting odds 
are posted. We define 4 dummy variables which indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), 
weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). 
Depending on which underlying probability measure is used, we label the above variables by [a] (when 
ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when Probdiff. is used). The p-values (in parentheses) of the t-test and the 




  N Reaction to odds [a] N Reaction to odds [b] 
    AR(-2) AR(-1) CAR(-2,-1)   AR(-2) AR(-1) CAR(-2,-1) 
         
SEW 357 5.96 -6.42 -0.47 271 11.38 -6.28 5.09 
p-value of t-test  (0.568) (0.530) (0.974)  (0.380) (0.601) (0.775) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.635) (0.666) (0.849)  (0.973) (0.903) (0.877) 
         
WEW 227 -15.91 8.10 -7.82 289 -15.51 2.18 -13.33 
p-value of t-test  (0.218) (0.522) (0.650)  (0.157) (0.849) (0.368) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.222) (0.221) (0.679)  (0.123) (0.277) (0.587) 
         
WEL 186 10.71 -12.02 -1.31 241 8.65 -11.40 -2.75 
p-value of t-test  (0.459) (0.345) (0.951)  (0.463) (0.275) (0.871) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.166) (0.077) (0.740)  (0.131) (0.106) (0.597) 
         
SEL 146 -18.85 14.84 -4.01 115 -25.50 28.66 3.16 
p-value of t-test  (0.287) (0.478) (0.888)  (0.227) (0.265) (0.929) 
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Table VIII 
Market reactions to odds: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) after the 
betting odds are posted. The dependent variables are CAR(-2,-1). We define 4 dummy variables which 
indicate whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected 
to lose (WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on which underlying probability measure is 
used to define the above categorization, we label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by 
[b] (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch is equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero 
otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the 
game is a home game and zero in case of an away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup 




    Specification [a] Specification [b] 
        CAR(-2,-1) CAR(-2,-1) 
     
Constant -14.26  -26.21  
 (0.960)  (0.927)  
SEW 19.42  33.16  
 (0.481)  (0.230)  
WEL 6.14  6.47  
 (0.835)  (0.810)  
SEL -1.99  6.96  
 (0.951)  (0.840)  
PostMarch 14.04  14.50  
 (0.561)  (0.549)  
AIM 18.54  28.11  
 (0.949)  (0.922)  
Home 6.39  4.08  
 (0.792)  (0.868)  
Cup -63.78  -66.50  
 (0.063)  (0.053)  
Year9900 -11.55  -11.02  
 (0.629)  (0.643)  
Year0001 -29.43  -29.43  
 (0.220)  (0.218)  
Team Dummies Yes  Yes  
     
R2 0.036  0.034  
F-Statistics 0.99  1.02  














Predictability of betting odds 
 
This table presents the average (cumulative) abnormal returns ((C)ARs) in basis points subsequent to the 
soccer games, categorized on the basis of the betting odds. We define 4 dummy variables which indicate 
whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to lose 
(WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on which underlying probability measure is used, we 
label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when Probdiff. is used). The p-values (in 
parentheses) of the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are presented in the first and second rows 
following the average abnormal returns, respectively. 
 
 
   Specification [a]  Specification [b] 
   N AR(1) AR(2) CAR(1,2)  N AR(1) AR(2) CAR(1,2) 
SEW 357 28.86 14.95 43.81 271 30.69 19.33 50.02 
p-value of t-test  (0.034) (0.138) (0.010)  (0.071) (0.118) (0.020) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.024) (0.050) (0.010)  (0.085) (0.065) (0.031) 
         
WEW 227 -0.04 -29.73 -29.76 289 6.80 -22.65 -15.86 
p-value of t-test  (0.998) (0.065) (0.188)  (0.565) (0.082) (0.380) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.308) (0.467) (0.724)  (0.082) (0.895) (0.682) 
         
WEL 186 -2.51 -23.23 -25.74 241 -2.08 -22.05 -24.12 
p-value of t-test  (0.903) (0.162) (0.381)  (0.903) (0.114) (0.326) 
p-value Wilcoxon  (0.412) (0.728) (0.697)  (0.129) (0.354) (0.779) 
         
SEL 146 12.68 -13.24 -0.56 115 16.54 -9.08 7.46 
p-value of t-test  (0.507) (0.393) (0.982)  (0.455) (0.613) (0.798) 
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Table X 
Predictability of betting odds: regression results 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results explaining the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) subsequent 
to the soccer games. The dependent variables are CAR(1,2). We define 4 dummy variables which indicate 
whether a team is strongly expected to win (SEW), weakly expected to win (WEW), weakly expected to lose 
(WEL) or strongly expected to lose (SEL). Depending on which underlying probability measure is used, we 
label the above variables by [a] (when ProbWin is used) and by [b]  (when ProbDiff. is used). PostMarch is 
equal to one if a game is played in April, May, or June, and zero otherwise; AIM is equal to one if the club is 
listed on the AIM and zero otherwise; Home is equal to one if the game is a home game and zero in case of an 
away game; Cup is equal to one if the game is a national cup game and zero otherwise. The p-values of the 
estimated coefficients are in parentheses. All regressions have 916 observations. 
 
 
    Specification [a] Specification [b] 
        CAR(1,2) CAR(1,2) 
     
Constant -130.58  -127.83  
 (0.704)  (0.710)  
SEW 81.19  70.65  
 (0.014)  (0.033)  
WEL 1.49  -7.66  
 (0.966)  (0.812)  
SEL 36.04  28.10  
 (0.353)  (0.495)  
PostMarch -32.94  -32.38  
 (0.254)  (0.263)  
AIM 43.60  49.05  
 (0.899)  (0.887)  
Home -9.71  -5.02  
 (0.737)  (0.864)  
Cup -3.68  -3.73  
 (0.928)  (0.928)  
Year9900 59.10  62.20  
 (0.039)  (0.029)  
Year0001 57.92  59.07  
 (0.043)  (0.039)  
Team Dummies Yes  Yes  
     
R2 0.036  0.034  
F-Statistics 1.38  1.32  
Prob > F 0.10  0.14  
 
 
 
